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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

5 May 1951

SUBJECT: DRAFT TERMS OF REFERENCE: NIE-36: BURMA:
PROSPECTS FOR SURVIVAL OF THE PRESENT REGIME
(For Consideration by the IAC Representatives)

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the prospects for the present non-Communist regime to survive insurgent military operations, and to estimate Chinese Communist intentions and capabilities to intervene directly or indirectly in support of the insurgent forces.

ASSUMPTION

Indefinite continuation of indecisive warfare in Korea.

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QUESTIONS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

I. CAPABILITIES OF THE BURMESE GOVERNMENT

- A. Size, equipment, disposition, experience, training, and reliability of military forces.
- B. Capabilities against uncoordinated insurgent operations, against coordinated insurgent operations, and against direct Chinese Communist invasion.
- C. Degree of government's will to resist and capacity to retain present political base of support under increasingly adverse circumstances.

II. CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS OF BURMESE INSURGENTS

- A. Present capabilities of individual insurgent forces.
- B. Prospects for coordinated anti-Government action by insurgent forces.
 - 1. Extent of present cooperation, if any.
 - 2. Extent of willingness to cooperate.
 - 3. Probable effectiveness of such combined insurgent operations as are likely to emerge.
- C. Chinese Communist aid: degree and nature of aid or control which insurgent forces would seek or accept; practical effect upon insurgent capabilities.

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III. CAPABILITIES OF THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS TO INTERVENE
COVERTLY OR OPENLY

- A. Indications of present nature and level of Chinese Communist assistance, if any, to insurgent group.
- B. Chinese Communist capabilities to provide materiel and technical assistance.
 - 1. Nature and extent of assistance available.
 - 2. Capabilities to deliver materiel.
- C. Capabilities of Chinese Communists to intervene openly.
 - 1. Number of available forces, assuming present commitments elsewhere.
 - 2. Number of available forces, assuming an increased commitment in Korea.
 - 3. Number of available forces, assuming new commitments against Taiwan or Indochina or for containing domestic dissidents.

IV. CHINESE COMMUNIST INTENTIONS TOWARD BURMA

- A. Ultimate intentions; probable nature of any Chinese-Soviet agreements regarding Burma.
- B. Effect, if any, of war in Korea on Chinese intentions.

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- C. Importance of Burma in Chinese Communist calculations, relative to Indochina and Taiwan.
- D. Probable present plans and tactics.